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ANN C. HODGES* 
Bargaining for Privacy in the Unionized 
Workplace 
Abstract: This article considers whether collective bargaining can enhance pri-
vacy protection for employees in the United States. Employers are increasingly 
engaging in practices that invade employee privacy with few existing legal pro-
tections to limit their actions. While data on the extent of bargaining about pri-
vacy is limited, it appears that unions in the U.S. have primarily used the griev-
ance and arbitration procedure to challenge invasions of privacy that lead to 
discipline of the employee instead of negotiating explicit contractual privacy 
rights. In contrast to the U.S., labor representatives in many other countries, par-
ticularly in the European Union, have greater legal rights of consultation with 
employers and take a more proactive approach to protection of employee priva-
cy. While this approach offers promise for achieving greater privacy for employ-
ees and more flexibility for employers, the article concludes that it is unlikely to 
be widely adopted in the U.S. because of the limited power of labor unions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the events of September 11, 2001, the focus of the nation shifted to 
national security and prevention of additional attack. The swiftly enacted 
USA Patriot Actl provided the government with sweeping powers of 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank my colleagues Daniel T. 
Murphy and Porcher L. Taylor, III, both of the University of Richmond, and Maurizio 
Del Conte, Professore Associato, Bocconi University for their comments on earlier 
drafts and Luke P. Wright, for his helpful research assistance. 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-156. 
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investigation and surveillance in order to provide protection from terror-
ism. Although passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of 
Congress, the Patriot Act quickly generated criticism from civil libertar-
ians and privacy advocates. The confluence of the Patriot Act with the 
advancements in technology that render monitoring of citizens and 
employees infinitely easier and cheaper makes the focus on workplace 
privacy particularly timely. 
While we purport to place a high value on privacy in the United 
States, actual protection of privacy is quite limited. Few can afford to live 
without employment, yet our right to privacy in the workplace is more 
circumscribed than in most other spheres of public life. Legitimate 
employer interests justify some intrusions on employee privacy. Yet many 
scholars have suggested that greater protection of employee privacy is 
warranted and is likely to come only by additional legislation.2 
In many other countries, stronger legislative protection for employee 
privacy exists. In addition, worker representatives in other countries often 
bargain for privacy protection for workers. While many of the most salient 
privacy issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining, U.S. unions do not 
appear to have placed significant priority on many privacy issues in bar-
gaining. Negotiated privacy protections offer some advantages over legis-
lation. Yet given the shrinking percentage of employees covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements, such protection may not reach many workers. 
This paper considers collective bargaining as a possible avenue for 
increased privacy protection for workers. Section 2 reviews briefly current 
employer practices that raise privacy concerns, along with existing legal 
protection for privacy in the workplace. Section 3 looks at the most signif-
icant current issues regarding employee privacy and concludes that most 
are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations 
Act, at least as they apply to employees rather than applicants for employ-
ment, and probably under many state collective bargaining laws as well. 
Section 4 looks at the context in which privacy issues have arisen in the 
unionized workplace, as well as the information that exists on the extent 
2 See, e.g., M. W. Fink.in, 'Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law', U 
Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L., Vol. 7, 2005, p. 279, pp. 280-281; S. E. Wilborn, 'Revisiting the 
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace', Ga. L. Rev., Vol. 
32, 1998, p. 825, pp. 879-880. Cf W. R. Corbett, 'The Need for a Revitalized Common 
Law of the Workplace', Brook. L. Rev., Vol. 69, 2003, p. 91 (arguing for revitalization 
of common law rather than legislation to address issues of electronic monitoring and 
genetic discrimination). But see C. Pearson-Fazekas, '1984 Is Still Fiction: Electronic 
Monitoring in the Workplace and U.S. Privacy Law', Duke L. & Tech. Rev., No. 15, 2004 
(arguing that existing law is sufficient, employee privacy rights in the workplace are lim-
ited, and there is little incentive for employer abuse). 
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to which privacy protections have been incorporated in collective bargain-
ing agreements. Section 5 looks at the international data on privacy and 
collective bargaining. Section 6 concludes that collective bargaining 
would be an effective way to provide additional privacy protection for 
employees, but since so few employees are covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements, this solution is of limited utility in the U.S. today. 
2. EXISTING PRACTICE AND EXISTING LAW 
The agenda for the conference illustrates the foremost privacy issues in 
today's workplace - electronic monitoring, privacy of medical and other 
employee records, medical, genetic and drug testing, and other restric-
tions on off-duty conduct. In recent years much of the focus has been on 
electronic monitoring, as technology has enabled employers to engage in 
constant supervision of employees at work, as well as to access employ-
ees' electronic communications. Among the most current issues are the 
employer's use of employee-tracking technology to monitor employees 
and employer restrictions on employee blogs.3 While there is no dispute 
that employers have the right to monitor employees to ensure that they are 
engaging in productive work and not violating workplace rules, the abil-
ity to conduct constant monitoring with electronic technology has altered 
the nature of supervision.4 As the technology enabling such monitoring 
has decreased in cost, monitoring has increased and, according to critics, 
raised employee stress levels.s Technology has also increased the ability 
of employers to engage in genetic testing and discrimination, bringing 
this issue to the forefront of the concerns of privacy advocates.6 
3 See 'Technology Issues Outpace Guidance From NLRB, Attorneys Tell ABA 
Conference', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 46, March 10, 2005; 'Employee Tracking 
Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee Backlash', Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004; T. Zeller, Jr., 'When the Blogger Biogs, Can the 
Employer Intervene', N. Y. Times, April 18, 2005, at CI; J. Boog, 'Employers Wrestle 
with "Blogosphere'", Nat'/ L.J., April 4, 2005, p. 5. 
4 For example, employers are using tracking systems on company vehicles to monitor 
employee location, driving speed, and time of stops. See 'Employee Tracking 
Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee Backlash', Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004. Identification badges are used directly on employ-
ees to determine how long employees spend on particular tasks and in certain locations. 
See id. Cell phones and handheld computers can also be used to track employees. See 
id. Employers are even using infrared technology on bathroom sinks and soap dis-
pensers to see how long employees spend washing their hands. See id. 
5 W.R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, pp. 102-103. 
6 /d.,pp.104-105. 
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2.1. Current Practice 
Employers investigate and monitor employees for several legitimate rea-
sons. Employers seek to hire and retain those workers who will be most 
productive. They want to be sure that employees are working effectively 
and efficiently. 7 Employers want healthy employees who are less likely to 
be absent or impose high health insurance costs. In addition, employers 
are concerned about potential liability for injury to employees or injury 
to third parties. s Further, employers desire to prevent loss of confidential 
information and breaches of computer security.9 Finally, where some 
problem occurs, missing inventory for example, employers investigate to 
determine the cause of the loss. All of these matters have the potential to 
affect the employer's profitability, thus spurring substantial employer 
concern. Despite the legitimacy of employer motives, 10 however, employ-
er practices intrude on employee privacy interests. Employees have an 
interest in protecting and controlling the use of personal information 
about them. I I Additionally, employees have a privacy interest in engag-
ing in some kinds of behavior free from regulation or surveillance.12 
These privacy interests clash with legitimate employer interests in ensur-
ing productivity, preventing liability, and protecting the company from 
loss, necessitating some reconciliation by law or agreement. 
According to an American Management Association study in 2001, 
82.2 per cent of major U.S. employers are 'actively recording and/or 
reviewing employee communication and behavior in the workplace' using 
7 It has been estimated that 'cyber-loafing', employees surfing the internet at work, costs 
businesses $54 billion per year. 'Workers, Surf at Your Own Risk', Bus. Wk., June 12, 
2000, p. 105. 
8 Some companies have settled sexual harassment suits based on e-mails at the cost of 
several million dollars, while others have fired employees who sent sexually offensive 
e-mails, presumably to avoid such claims. See 'Workers, Surf at Your Own Risk', op. 
cit., supra note 7, p. 105. 
9 Indeed, employer concerns about privacy of employee, customer or citizen data may 
prompt monitoring or restrictions on the use of certain technologies. See TLK2UL8R: 
The Privacy Implications of Instant and Text Messaging Technologies in State Govern-
ment, Research Brief, National Association of State Chief Information Officers, 2005, 
pp. 6-7, available at <http://www.nascio.org/nascioCommittees/privacy/instantMessaging 
Brief.pdf> (last visited September 29, 2005). 
I 0 Certainly, there are improper motives for employer monitoring as well, including curios-
ity, voyeurism, and a desire to interfere with employee efforts to unionize. See D. R. 
Nolan, 'Privacy and Profitability in the Technological Workplace', J. Lab. Res., Vol. 24, 
2003,pp.207,215-216. 
11 R. L. Belair, Employee Rights to Privacy, Proceedings of New York University Thirty-
Third Annual National Conference on Labor, 1981, pp. 3-4. 
12 Id. 
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Copyright 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved. 
No claims asserted to original government works. 
SUMMER2006 151 
electronic monitoring.13 Monitoring increased dramatically in the short 
time between 1997 and 2001. For example, '[i]n 2001, 36.l per cent of 
firms reporting monitored computer files, compared to 13. 7 per cent in 
1997; 46.5 per cent monitored e-mail in 2001, compared to 14.9 per cent 
in 1997.' 14 The 2005 AMA survey on electronic monitoring and surveil-
lance shows that monitoring has continued to increase since 2001.15 
Seventy-six per cent of employers surveyed monitor employees' web site 
connections, while 36 per cent track 'content, keystrokes and time spent 
at the keyboard.'16 Fifty per cent of employers kept and reviewed employ-
ees' computer files and 55 per cent stored and reviewed employees' e-
mail.17 Twenty-five per cent of employers had terminated an employee 
for violating e-mail policy.18 Over 80 per cent of employers notified the 
employees of monitoring and retention of files.19 
Monitoring of telephone conversations and video surveillance also 
increased dramatically. The percentage of employers monitoring employ-
ee phone usage and tracking the phone numbers called increased from 9 
per cent in 2001 to 51 per cent in 2005.20 In 2001 only 9 per cent of 
employers surveyed taped employee phone calls, while 19 per cent taped 
calls of at least some employees in 2005 and 3 per cent taped calls of all 
employees.21 The percentage of employers using video monitoring to 
detect theft, violence and sabotage jumped from 33 per cent in 2001 to 
51 per cent in 2005.22 Monitoring for performance also has increased, 
with 10 per cent of employers videotaping some employees and 6 per 
cent taping all employees.23 As for existing policies, the following per-
13 R. Bigler and W. Petzel, 'Employer Snooping: What Rights Do Workers Really Have?', 
Feb. 13, 2002, available at <http://www.lraonline.org/print.php?id=98>, citing the 
American Management Association Study. 
14 M. W. Finkin, 'Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The United States Law', 
Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'yJ., Vol. 23, 2002, pp. 471-474. 
15 American Management Association, 2005 Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance 
Survey, 2005, available at <http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS_sumrnary05.pdf 
>(last visited September 29, 2005) (hereinafter 'AMA, 2005 Survey'). 
16 Id. The survey consisted of 526 employers of various sizes. Id. 
17 Id. In a 2004 survey of840 employers, 60 per cent monitored external e-mail using software. 
See American Management Association, 2004 Workplace E-Mail and Instant Messaging 
Survey Summary, available at http://www.amanet.org/research/ 
pdfs/IM_2004_Summary.pdf> (last visited May 6, 2005) (hereinafter 'AMA, 2004 Survey'). 
18 Id. The same percentage reported terminations for e-mail use and terminations for inter-
net abuse in the 2005 survey. AMA, 2005 Survey. 
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centages of employers reported maintaining the specified policies: per-
sonal e-mail use - 84 per cent; personal internet use - 81 per cent; per-
sonal instant messenger use - 42 per cent; operation of personal web sites 
on company time - 34 per cent; personal postings on corporate biogs -
23 per cent; and operating personal biogs on work time - 20 per cent.24 
Employers have been slower to adopt monitoring in newly emerging 
areas of technology.25 As of 2004, only 11.1 per cent of responding 
employers used software to manage instant messaging.26 As for global 
positioning technology, 5 per cent of responding employers in 2005 used 
it to monitor cell phones, 8 per cent to keep track of company vehicles, 
and 8 per cent to monitor employee id cards.27 Fifty-three percent of 
employers used such technology 'to control physical security and access 
to buildings and data centers.'28 Fingerprint scans were used by 5 per cent 
of employers, facial recognition technology by 2 per cent of employers 
and iris scans by 0.5 per cent of employers.29 
A 2004 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management 
revealed that employers most often monitor computer use and internet 
use.30 On the other hand, the employers rarely engaged in desk searches, 
opened postal mail, or listened to employee phone conversations.31 About 
one quarter of employers frequently used electronic identification cards 
to monitor employee movement, while fewer used cameras to do so on a 
frequent basis. 32 A Government Accounting Office study of 14 large 
employers found that all routinely store information on employees' com-
puter activity.33 Eight of the companies used the files to investigate 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 AMA, 2004 Survey. A number of respondents, 28.4 per cent, however, were unsure if 
their employer used software to monitor instant messaging. Id. 
27 AMA, 2005 Survey. 
28 Id. These access cards can be used to monitor employee location in the building also, 
which raises privacy concerns. See E. Balkovich, T. K. Bikson, and G. Bitko, 9 to 5; 'Do 
You Know ifYour Boss Knows Where You Are?', 2, Rand Corp., 2005, pp. 16, available 
at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND _ TRl 97 .pdf> (last visited 
September 29, 2005)(hereinafter 'Rand Study'). 
29 AMA, 2005 Survey. 
30 SHRM Research, Workplace Privacy, p. 21, January 2005, available at 
<http://www.shrm.org/surveys/Workplace%20Privacy%20Poll%20Findings%20-
%20A%20Study%20by%20SHRM%20and%20CareerJoumal.com.pdf>. Large organi-
zations engaged in more monitoring than smaller ones. Id., p. 22. 
31 Id.,p.21. 
32 Id., pp. 19-20. 
33 U.S. General Accounting Office, Employee Privacy: Computer-Use Monitoring 
Practices and Policies of Selected Companies, GA0-02-717, September 27, 2002, avail-
able at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02717.pdf> (Last visited May 6, 2005) (here-
inafter 'GAO Report'). 
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reports of employee violations of company policies, while six regularly 
reviewed employee computer activity to determine whether any viola-
tions had occurred.34 A Rand Study of six employers using radio-fre-
quency identification cards for employee access in the workplace demon-
strated that cards were used not only for access but also for the collection 
and retention of personally identifiable data regarding employee move-
ment. 35 Five of the six organizations used such data to investigate inci-
dents such as theft or other alleged misconduct or to determine compli-
ance with work rules.36 In three organizations, the data was available not 
only to security departments but also to other departments such as human 
resources, legal and line management.37 None of the organizations had a 
policy regarding the use of the system which was provided to all employ-
ees, thus limiting employee knowledge.38 The authors concluded that pri-
vacy was of low priority to the organizations, subordinate to security, 
investigation, emergency procedures and employment policies.39 
An AMA study on medical testing in 2004 revealed that 63 per cent 
of the responding companies required medical testing of new hires, 
employees, or both.40 Most of the testing was for illegal substances or fit-
ness for duty, with about 15.1 per cent of companies testing for suscepti-
bility to workplace hazards.41 Drug testing and fitness-for-duty testing 
have decreased since 1995 and 1997 respectively, while testing for HIV 
peaked in 1997 and has decreased since.42 A small percentage of employ-
ers appear to engage in genetic testing, with breast/colon cancer, sickle-
cell anemia, and Huntington's Disease listed as reasons for testing.43 
2.2. Legal Restrictions 
Legal restrictions on employers whose investigative and monitoring tac-
tics infringe on employee privacy are limited. The Employee Polygraph 
34 Id., p. 3. 
35 Rand Study, op. cit., supra note 28, p. 12. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id., pp. 14, 15, 16. 
39 Id., p. 16. 
40 American Management Association, AMA 2004 Workplace Testing Survey: Medical 
Testing, available at <http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/Medical_testing_04.pdt> 
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Protection Act restricts the use of polygraph exams,44 and many states 
also have polygraph laws4s with the more protective state laws supersed-
ing the federal.46 The Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA') limits the 
ability of covered employers to require medical exams.47 For employees, 
exams must be job-related.48 For applicants, exams can be required only 
after a conditional job offer has been made, and any disqualification 
based on the exam must be job-related.49 In addition, medical records 
must be kept confidential and separate from other personnel records.so 
Drug tests, however, are excluded from these ADA restrictions.SI Some 
states have passed laws regulating drug testing in various ways, but none 
prohibit testing.s2 Also, in recent years, a number of states have enacted 
legislation either preventing employers from requiring genetic testing, or 
limiting the use of the results of such tests.s3 President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 13145 which limits disclosure of genetic information 
and prohibits discrimination based on genetic information in federal 
employment. S4 In addition, the EEOC interprets the ADA to prohibit 
44 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009. The Polygraph Act contains exemptions for government 
employers and some private employers involved in the security, national defense and 
pharmaceutical industries, however. See 29 U.S.C. §2006. 
45 For a listing of state laws, see M. W. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law, (2d ed.), 2003, 
pp. 490-540. For discussion of state law restrictions on polygraphs, see H. D. Kelly, Jr. 
& W. A. Herbert, When James Bond Enters the Workplace: Uses and Abuses of 
Technology -A Guide for In-House Counsel and Litigators, 2004, pp. 31-32, available 
at <http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2004/kelly.doc>, (last visited June 8, 
2005). 
46 See 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (providing that the law does not preempt more restrictive state 
laws or collective bargaining agreements.) 
47 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2),(3). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 12 J 12(d)(3)(8). HIPAA regulations also deal with the privacy of medical 
records but apply to employers only when they act in the capacity of plan sponsors under 
ERISA. See M. Finkin, supra note 45, at pp. 44-45. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d). Indeed various federal agencies require drug testing of employ-
ees in certain industries. See, e.g., Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, 49 
U.S.C. §§ 45101-45106 (requiring drug testing of employees in the transportation indus-
try.) Also, the Drug Free Workplace Act requires federal grantees to maintain drug free 
workplaces. 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 
52 M.A. Rothstein and L. Liebman, Employment Law, (5th ed.), 2003, p. 241. For a com-
prehensive listing of such laws, see M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 542-690. 
53 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 22, 791-822; W. R. Corbett, op. cit., supra, note 
2, p. 113; W. A. Herbert, The NLRA in a Technological Society: A Law Not Busy Being 
Born, Is Busy Dying, 2005, pp. 13-17 (copy on file with the author). 
54 Exec. Order No. 13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000). 
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genetic discrimination.SS Finally some states protect employee personnel 
files from disclosure and/or provide employee access to the information 
contained there.S6 
In addition to specific legislation, most states have either a common 
law or statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy. The reasonable 
expectation of privacy has been imported from the constitutional context 
into both common law and statutory privacy contexts.s7 Thus, if employ-
ees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, any invasion of pri-
vacy is lawful. The incentive then is for employers to defeat the expecta-
tion of privacy by either employment rule or requiring employee consent 
to searches as a condition of employment.SS It is rare that employees are 
able to challenge employer infringements on privacy successfully using 
the common law. s9 
Regarding technological monitoring, as Professor Finkin states in his 
article detailing the U.S. law on workplace privacy and information tech-
nology, ' [ d]espite the wealth of legal thought, the state of the law in the 
United States relevant to the topic addressed here has been put in one 
short sentence: "No successful standards, legal or otherwise, exist in the 
United States for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data 
in cyberspace."'60 In addition to the common law, two federal statutes, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Stored 
Communications Act, limit data collection and interception of communi-
cations, but exceptions permit most employer monitoring of employees 
55 W. R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, p. 113. It is not clear, however, that courts will 
defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute. Id. The EEOC brought a claim against 
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company challenging genetic testing based 
on the ADA and reached a settlement with the company providing $2.2 million to the 
tested workers. 'EEOC's First Genetic Testing Challenge Settled for $2.2 Million, 
Parties Announce', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 90, at A-1 (May 9, 2002). 
56 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 717-756. 
57 D.R. Nolan, op. cit., supra note 10, p. 220. 
58 Id., p. 221. 
59 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, at xxviii. Egregious cases may be the exception to 
this rule. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals recently allowed a state Jaw inva-
sion of privacy claim to proceed to trial where the employer allegedly utilized video sur-
veillance in the women's restroom for over two years in response to a rumor that drug 
dealing was occurring in the restroom. Johnson v. Allen, 2005 Ga. App. Lexis 311. For 
further discussion of cases in which employees have been successful in common law 
invasion of privacy cases, see H. D. Kelly and W. A. l-{erbert, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 
6-8, 17-18. 
60 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, p. 471, quoting P. Schwartz, Privacy, Participation, 
and Cyberspace: An American Perspective, in Zur Autonomie des lndividuums: Liber 
Amicorum Spiros Simitis, D. Simon and M. Weiss (eds.), 2000, pp. 337-338. 
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who use the employer's communication systems.61 A few state laws 
require that notice of monitoring be given to the employees.62 
Additionally, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits employer sur-
veillance of union or protected concerted activity.63 
There is also a group of state statutes that protect employees' rights 
to engage in certain lawful activities while off-duty. Most of the laws pro-
tect employees' right to use tobacco products, but some extend to alco-
hol, some to use of any lawful product, and a few to other lawful activi-
ties.64 Some of these laws have exceptions allowing employers to limit 
employee rights for job related reasons.65 In the absence of these statuto-
ry restrictions, employers may lawfully refuse to hire or terminate 
employees for off-duty conduct, so long as they do not violate any other 
legal limitation such as discrimination laws or constitutional rights.66 
61 D.R. Nolan, op. cit., supra, note 10, pp. 224-25. One of the exceptions is consent. Id. 
An employer could require employees to consent to any and all monitoring, thus bring-
ing its actions within the statutory exception while at same time defeating any expecta-
tion of privacy at common law. 
62 See D. R Nolan, op. cit., supra note 10, p. 225; M. Finkin, supra note 14, pp. 477-478; 
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 757-762. Some states also have laws similar to 
ECPA, but they generally contain the same exceptions. D. R. Nolan, op. cit., supra note 
10, p. 225. 
63 The Developing Labor Law, (4th ed.), P. Hardin and J.E. Higgins, Jr., (eds.), 2001, p. 162. 
64 See M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 113-114, 691-716. For a discussion of these 
laws as they relate to romantic relationships, see S. Stiller, 'Statutes Limiting 
Regulation of Workplace Romances', Arbitration 1998: The Changing World of Dispute 
Resolution, Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Meeting, National Academy of 
Arbitrators, p. 22, 1999. Notably, an office romance recently led to the termination of 
Boeing's CEO, although the use of the company's computers to send romantic e-mails 
and the company's image concerns suggest that the situation might not fall into the cat-
egory of off-duty conduct with no impact on employment. See 'The End of the Office 
Affair? Face Value', The Economist, March 12, 2005, p. 64. 
65 See M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 113-114. 
66 Discrimination laws protect employees from discrimination on the basis of religion, 
unless the employee's belief or practice cannot be reasonably accommodated, pregnan-
cy, and in some states, political affiliation and marital status. See M. Finkin, op. cit., 
supra note 45, pp. 367-380, 391-393, 397-398. In the public sector, there also may be 
constitutional restrictions on termination or discrimination based on, inter alia, political 
affiliation, religious belief, and protected speech. See, e.g., Barrow v. Greenville Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 332 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing constitutionally protected privacy 
right to direct education of children including enrolling them in private school); 'Jury 
Awards $35,455 to Teacher Denied Job Because Her Children Attend Private School', 
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (ENA), Vol. 43, p. 2105, at p. 413 (April 26, 2005) (reporting on 
favorable jury verdict for Barrow); Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that college did not violate speech and associational rights of teacher by refus-
ing to renew her contract because of her attendance at a WTO protest rally with some 
of her students). 
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This would include employee blogging and participation m computer 
chat rooms. 67 
Public-sector employees have more protection than private-sector 
employees by virtue of the Constitution, which establishes the right of 
privacy as fundamental.68 Based on the right of privacy, public employ-
ees may limit employer inquiries into their private lives.69 Also, the 
Fourth Amendment has been applied to drug testing and other workplace 
searches.70 Workplace searches are subjected to a different test than those 
conducted for law enforcement purposes, however.7 1 First, the employee 
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy and then a balancing test 
is applied to determine whether legitimate employer interests outweigh 
the employee's privacy interests.72 Under this standard, governmental 
drug testing has been upheld in a number of employment contexts, but 
67 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, pp. 486-488. 
68 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Enforcement of constitutional 
privacy rights may not be easy, however. See, e.g., Giaccio v. City of New York, 16 Am. 
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 653 (2005) (dismissing city employee's constitutional privacy 
claim based on release of drug and alcohol test results to the media because plaintiff did 
not allege that the action occurred as a result of a policy or practice of the municipality 
as required for an action under Section 1983). See also City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156 (1997) (finding that refusal to pro-
mote employee based on his affair with the wife of a fellow officer does not violate pri-
vacy rights under the U.S. or Texas constitutions). 
69 Wilborn, supra note 2, at 866 & n.155. The Privacy Act also provides some protection 
to federal employees. See United States Dep 't of Defense v. Fed 'I Lab. Rel. Au th., 510 
U.S. 487 (1994) (holding that Privacy Act bars disclosure of employees' home address-
es to requesting unions). Claims of violation of the Privacy Act have been brought in 
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't 
Employees, Local R4-27 and U.S., Dep't of Defense, 60 FLRA No. 5 (2004)(upholding 
arbitrator's decision that Privacy Act was not violated by agency that contacted employ-
ee's medical provider to discuss recommended work schedule). As in U.S. Dep 't of 
Defense v. FLRA, supra, the Privacy Act may be used to prevent unions from obtaining 
information for purposes of collective bargaining. See U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 51 
FLRA 599 ( 1996) ( holding that Privacy Act barred disclosure of employee performance 
ratings and awards by name to union). But See Department of the Air Force v. Fed'! Lab. 
Rel. Auth., 104 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding supervisor's privacy interest did not 
outweigh the union's need for copy of letter disciplining supervisor to determine 
whether to proceed with grievance). 
70 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Psychological testing is not considered a search under 
the Fourth Amendment, however. See Greenawalt v. Indiana Dep 't of Corrections, 397 
F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2005). 
71 The Court in Von Raab noted that 'requiring a warrant in this context would serve only 
to divert valuable agency resources from the Service's primary mission.' 489 U.S. at 
666-667. 
72 See NTEU v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-666. 
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limited in others. 73 The result typically depends on the jobs of the 
employees being tested and the nature of the testing. Like drug testing 
cases, cases applying the Fourth Amendment to electronic monitoring 
and computer file searches have mixed results, some finding violations 
of privacy rights and others allowing monitoring or searches.74 
2.3 Proposed Legislation 
Despite agitation over the lack of workplace privacy, enactment of any 
comprehensive legislation seems remote. Privacy advocates have lobbied 
for legislation at the state and federal levels with limited success.75 The 
two exceptions have been in the area of genetic information and tobacco 
use, the former probably attributable to deep public concern over the use 
of genetic information and the latter to the strength of the tobacco lobby. 
As Professor Finkin has noted, privacy legislation in the U.S. tends to be 
limited and enacted in direct response to particular perceived problems. 76 
Outside those contexts, employees in the private sector nonunion work-
place have limited protection for privacy interests, while employees in the 
public sector have greater but still limited protection. But what of the 
unionized workplace? Are conditions there any different? 
73 See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers 
of Am. v. Fink, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge 
to random drug testing of employees carrying firearms, health care workers caring for 
individuals in state care, corrections employees with unsupervised access to prisoners, 
probationers or parolees, and employees with unsupervised access to controlled sub-
stances), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005). Notably, this challenge was brought by 
the union to the testing program incorporated in its collective bargaining agreement 
with the state. 385 F.3d at 1006. 
74 Compare Varnado v. Department of Employment and Training, 687 So. 2d I 013, I 024-
1030 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(finding search of employee's files on state-owned computer 
violated employee's reasonable expectation of privacy) and State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d 
1265, 1273 n.5 (Haw. 1993) (finding violation of Hawaii constitutional provision com-
parable to the Fourth Amendment based on video surveillance of the employees' break 
room) with Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174 (!st Cir. 1997) 
(allowing video surveillance of workplace); Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass 'n 
v. Sacramento County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1996) (same) and Biby v Board 
of Regents, University of Nebraska, 419 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding employee had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where employer's computer 
policy informed employees that university could search files for legitimate reasons). 
75 See D. R. Nolan, supra note I 0, p. 227 (discussing proposed federal legislation). Most 
recently, legislation has been introduced to protect employee privacy in changing areas. 
See Employee Changing Room Privacy Act, H.R. 582, introduced by Rep. Tom Petri (R-
Wis.) and Rep. Rob Andrews (D-N.J.). 
76 M. Finkin, supra note 14, pp. 472-473. 
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3. PRIVACY AS A MANDATORY BARGAINING SUBJECT 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, employers are required to bar-
gain only over mandatory subjects of bargaining.77 The NLRB has held 
that both medical exams and drug testing of employees are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.78 The same is true of the installation of video sur-
veillance cameras. 79 In finding video surveillance to be a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining, the Board stated: 
[T]he installation of surveillance cameras is both germane to the 
working environment, and outside the scope of managerial deci-
sions lying at the core of entrepreneurial control. 
As to the first factor - germane to the working environment -
the installation of surveillance cameras is analogous to physical 
examinations, drug/alcohol testing requirements, and polygraph 
testing, all of which the Board has found to be mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. They are all investigatory tools or methods 
used by an employer to ascertain whether any of its employees 
has engaged in misconduct. 
The Respondent implemented the installation and use of sur-
veillance cameras because of an increase in workplace theft and 
other suspected employee misconduct in the facility, such as 
reports of employees sleeping instead of working. The Respondent 
acknowledges that employees caught involved in theft and/or other 
misconduct are subject to discipline, including discharge. 
Accordingly, the installation and use of surveillance cameras has 
the potential to affect the continued employment of employees 
whose actions are being monitored. 
77 NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
78 See Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 273 NLRB 171, 177 (1984)(medical exams); Johnson-
Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180 (1989) (drug testing). 
79 See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997). Accord, National Steel Corp. v. 
NLRB, 324 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003)(ordering employer to provide union with informa-
tion regarding hidden security cameras and negotiate about confidentiality protections); 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 NLRB No. 49 (2004), enf'd sub. nom, Brewers and Maltsters 
Local 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(finding employer violated NLRA by fail-
ing to bargain with union prior to installation of hidden surveillance cameras in area 
used for work and breaks, and by refusing to supply information to the union about the 
use and installation of the cameras). 
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Further, as the judge finds, the use of surveillance cameras in 
the restroom and fitness center raises privacy concerns which 
add to the potential effect upon employees. We agree that these 
areas are part of the work environment and that the use of hid-
den cameras in these areas raises privacy concerns which 
impinged upon the employees' working conditions. The use of 
cameras in these or similar circumstances is unquestionably ger-
mane to the working environment ... 
The installation and use of surveillance cameras in the work-
place are not among that class of managerial decisions that lie at 
the core of entrepreneurial control. The use of surveillance cam-
eras is not entrepreneurial in character, is not fundamental to the 
basic direction of the enterprise, and impinges directly upon 
employment security. It is a change in the Respondent's methods 
used to reduce workplace theft or detect other suspected employ-
ee misconduct with serious implications for its employees' job 
security, which in no way touches on the discretionary 'core of 
entrepreneurial control.' (footnotes omitted).80 
Although the Board has not ruled on whether other forms of electronic 
monitoring are mandatory bargaining subjects, it seems likely that the 
rationale of Colgate-Palmolive would apply, leading the Board to find 
that bargaining is required. Similarly, since genetic testing is a form of 
medical testing, it is probable that the Board would conclude that bar-
gaining over such testing is required. It also seems likely that most 
restrictions on off-duty conduct such as smoking, alcohol, and fraterniza-
tion would be conditions of employment subject to bargaining. Unions 
are generally only entitled to demand bargaining over these issues as they 
impact current employees, however. In Star Tribune, the Board conclud-
ed that hiring practices are not negotiable unless they vitally affect the 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees. 81 
Another factor which may affect the bargaining obligation is whether 
the employer's implementation of a new system implicating privacy 
rights is in fact a change in working conditions. If not, bargaining will not 
be required. The Board has addressed this issue in several cases. In Rust 
Craft Broadcasting, 82 the Board concluded that the change from manual 
timekeeping to mechanical timekeeping was not an unlawful unilateral 
80 Colgate-Palmolive, 323 NLRB at 515-516. 
81 295 NLRB 543 (1989). 
82 225 NLRB 327 (I 976). 
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change because it was merely a different method of recording time. A 
change from a time clock to supervisory recording of employees' work 
time required bargaining, however.83 Because of the involvement of 
supervisors in direct monitoring and the employees' inability to check the 
accuracy of the records, the new system was a significant change. 84 In 
2001, an administrative law judge found that a change from signing in 
and out to a biometric system using fingerprints was more like the for-
mer than the latter, and no bargaining was required. 85 In reaching that 
conclusion, the judge distinguished the case from Vincent, finding that no 
more supervisory oversight was involved and there was no evidence that 
employees could not check the accuracy of their records. 86 Further the 
judge noted that there was no evidence that the fingerprints recorded by 
the system could be used in criminal or workplace investigations, other 
than those involving time of arrival and departure. 87 
Similarly, the General Counsel refused to issue a complaint in a case 
where the employer replaced a two-way radio system in employee vehi-
cles with a computer unit containing a Global Positioning System 
(GPS).88 The Roadway Express case is a troubling application of the uni-
lateral change doctrine. A GPS is far more intrusive than a two-way radio 
as it allows the company to track each move of the truck as it happens. 
The company can determine the truck's route, the length of time a trip 
takes and how long a break the driver takes. The General Counsel found 
the systems to be the same because both use a mechanical method of 
obtaining the same information. 89 According to the General Counsel, the 
only difference was whether the employer or the employee initiated the 
use of the system for reporting.90 In fact, however, it is a change from 
time-specified radio reports to at least potential constant employer mon-
itoring. Thus the correct analogy is a change from supervisory monitor-
ing of work, which is not constant, but initiated on occasion by the 
employer, to constant monitoring by video surveillance, which the Board 
has found negotiable. One could also analogize it to the change from 
supervisory investigation of theft to use of hidden security cameras to 
detect theft, also negotiable.91 Since the Board has found employee pri-
83 Vincent Industrial Plastics, 328 NLRB 300 (1999). 
84 Id. at 300, n. 1. 
85 Res-Care, Inc., 2001 NLRB Lexis 397. 
86 Id. at *23. 
87 Id. at *23-*24. 
88 Roadway Express, Inc., Case No. 13-CA-39940-1 (2002). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB at 519. 
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vacy to be a condition of employment, the greater impact of GPS systems 
on privacy should lead to the conclusion that this unilateral change 
required bargaining.92 
Scope of bargaining issues in the public sector are less straightfor-
ward, as federal law applies to federal employees and multiple state laws 
govern bargaining at the state and local level. Furthermore, to the extent 
that other statutory and constitutional provisions exist which deal with 
these subjects, those laws will impact bargaining. While this is also true 
in the private sector, in the public sector statutory restrictions on bargain-
ing subjects are more common. In the federal sector, the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority held that certain union proposals relating to drug 
testing were not negotiable because they interfered with the employer's 
rights under statutes and executive orders.93 Other proposals of the union 
were negotiable, however, as they impinged on no management rights.94 
While many of the privacy-related issues are likely to be conditions 
of employment and thus commonly within the description of bargainable 
subjects under most public sector statutes, other laws and managerial 
rights may limit bargaining. For example, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals recently considered whether Sherburne County Minnesota must 
adopt bargaining over a new drug testing policy.95 The court first noted 
that the state statute governing drug testing permits collective bargaining 
over testing policies so long as the negotiated policies meet or exceed the 
statutory requirements and do not conflict with the employee protection 
standards in the statute.96 The court then concluded that the drug testing 
policy was a subject in which matters of inherent managerial policy, 
exempt from bargaining, overlapped with mandatorily negotiable terms 
and conditions of employment.97 
In cases where there is such an overlap, a two-step process is 
required: first, the court must determine whether the policy has 
an impact on 'terms and conditions of employment,' and second, 
if it does, the court must ascertain whether the policy's establish-
ment is separate and distinct from its implementation. 
92 For further critical analysis of the decision in Roadway Express, see Herbert, supra note 
53, at 10-11. 
93 See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, 'Resolving Drug Issues', (1993) pp. 141-142, citing 
'Department of the Army, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chem. Command', 30 
FLRA, No. 115, 1988. 
94 Id., p. 142. 
95 Law Enf't Lab. Serv. v. Sherburne Co., 695 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. App. 2005). 
96 Id., p. 634. 
97 Id., p. 634-636. 
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If the establishment and the implementation are not separate and 
distinct, implementation is not subject to mandatory bargain-
ing .... But if establishment and implementation are separate and 
distinct, implementation is subject to bargaining.( citations omit-
ted).98 
163 
The court determined that the establishment of the policy was an inher-
ent managerial right that did not require bargaining and that no bargain-
ing was required over the employee classifications subject to testing.99 
Nevertheless, there were other areas of implementation that were separa-
ble from the establishment of the program and thus, subject to negotia-
tions.100 
A similar decision was reached in a California case involving a 
request to bargain over the impact of the installation of a new security 
monitoring system.101 After a homicide at the facility, the employer 
adopted a new system to keep track of employees and visitors.102 The 
new system required employees upon entry and exit to use a personal ID 
number, typing it on a keypad or swiping an ID card, and also to touch a 
fingerprint scanner. The administrative law judge rejected the employer's 
argument that the "system was a non-negotiable upgrade of the existing 
system."103 The judge noted, based on precedent, that bargaining over the 
decision to install the equipment was not required. The judge concluded, 
however, that the employer was required to bargain over the impact of the 
decision on the employees including, but not limited to, the privacy 
effects of storage of the fingerprints of employees and union representa-
tives, the possibility of discipline as a result of use of the system, and the 
impact of delays at entry points on compensable employee hours. 104 The 
decision became final because no exceptions were filed, but is not prece-
dential.105 The analysis in these two decisions exemplifies the way many 
public-sector agencies are likely to treat employer policies and practices 
that implicate privacy, requiring, at a minimum, bargaining over the 
impact on terms and conditions of employment unless clearly excluded 
from bargaining by the legislature. In some states, bargaining over the 
98 Id., p. 635. 
99 Id., p. 636. 
100 Id., pp. 636-637. 
101 See California St. Employees Ass 'n v. California Youth Authority, 23 PERC (LRP) 
P30114 (1999), aff'd without exceptions, 23 PERC (LRP) P30149 (1999). 
102 All facts are taken from the opinion of the administrative law judge. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 23 PERC (LRP) P 30149 (1999). 
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decision may not be required because it is considered inherently manage-
rial.106 Drug testing as a bargaining subject has been addressed by more 
states than other privacy-related issues. Grodin, Malin and Weisberger 
report that state and local jurisdictions vary on whether drug testing of 
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining.101 
Because of constitutional limitations on employers in the public sec-
tor, another question arises for unions there. Can the union bargain away 
the employees' constitutional rights? Existing cases have mixed results, 
some holding such a waiver is permissiblel08 and others finding to the 
contrary.109 In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., the court suggested that 
the union's agreement to drug testing in the collective bargaining agree-
ment affected the employees' expectations of privacy.110 Under this 
rationale, the union may limit the employees constitutional rights without 
a direct waiver. Also, in the federal sector, the Civil Service Reform Act 
may limit employees to the contractual grievance procedure for constitu-
tional and statutory privacy claims.111 
106 See, e.g., City of Syracuse, 14 NYPERB P4645 (1981) (finding management had right 
to install video surveillance cameras without negotiating with the union). See also 
Roswell Park Cancer Institute, 34 NYPER (LRP) P4582 (2001 ), ajf 'd, 34 NYPER 
(LRP) P3040 (2001) (finding no duty to bargain where security cameras are used for 
monitoring broader group than just employees and there is no indication that employees 
are threatened with discipline or must participate in surveillance). 
107 J. R. Grodin et al., Public Sector Employment: Cases and Materials, 2004, p. 229. The 
authors note, however, widespread agreement that testing of applicants is not a manda-
tory bargaining subject. Id. 
108 See Bolden v SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 826-29 (3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that union may 
consent to drug testing that implicates employees' Fourth Amendment rights so long as 
union does not breach its duty of fair representation) and cases cited therein; Geffre v. 
Metro. Council, 174 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Minn. 2001) (same). 
109 See Anonymous Fireman v. Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 415 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (allow-
ing HIV testing but finding union cannot waive employee's constitutional right through 
collective bargaining). 
110 863 F.2d 111, 119 (!st Cir. 1988). 
111 See Whitman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 382 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that court had 
no subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims that the FAA violated his con-
stitutional right of privacy and his statutory right to nondiscriminatory drug testing 
because the FAA personnel system incorporated the civil service requirement that the 
collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure would be the exclusive remedy 
for matters within its coverage unless the matter was excluded by the contract or fell 
within a statutory exception), cert. granted, 2005 U.S. Lexis 5032 (June 27, 2005). The 
Federal Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have both held that the collective bargaining 
agreement is exclusive only as to administrative and not judicial claims, leading to the 
circuit split that prompted the grant of certiorari in Whitman. See Asociacion de 
Empleados de! Area Cana/era v. Panama Canal Comm 'n, 329 F.3d 1235 (I Ith Cir. 
2003); Mudge v. United States, 308 F.3d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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4. BARGAINING OVER PRIVACY 
It appears that both public and private sector unions have the right to 
demand bargaining over many issues impacting employee privacy. But 
are they? Evidence is somewhat limited. 
4.1. Privacy Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements 
A 1992 Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey investigated privacy provisions 
in 614 collective bargaining agreements, covering 1000 or more workers 
each.112 Of the 614 contracts, 380 contained some reference to privacy.113 
While this suggests significant focus on privacy in collective bargaining, 
a closer look at the classifications used reveals that the study employed a 
very broad definition of privacy provisions. A review of the survey data 
suggests that many areas of privacy were addressed in a limited way, or 
not at all, in the agreements studied. To be classified as containing a pri-
vacy provision, the contract had to have one or more of the following: 1. 
a requirement of notice that information was being placed in the employ-
ee's personnel file; 2. a restriction on the use of employee records; 3. a 
right to access and comment on employee personnel records; 4. a provi-
sion for confidentiality of employee records or files; or 5. one or more 
particular limitations on substance abuse testing.114 
The notice and access requirements have limited impacts on the 
employee privacy concerns considered here. Further, the most common 
provisions were those protecting the use of employee records, primarily 
disciplinary records.115 Most of those contract clauses dealt with warn-
ings and notices of discipline placed in employee files.J 16 The second 
most common privacy provision related to substance abuse plans and 
employee assistance programs, more directly relevant to current employ-
ee privacy concerns.111 
112 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Privacy Provisions in Major 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1992', Bulletin, No. 2448, 1994. There are several 
obvious limitations on this data. It is 13 years old, it encompasses only the private sec-
tor, and includes only large collective bargaining units. Id. 
113 Id., p. 3. 
114 Id. at 3. The study also classified as privacy provisions restrictions on discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and marital status, and prohibitions on sexual harassment. 
Id., pp. 44-45. 
115 Id., p. 4. 
116 Id., p. 5. 
117 Id. One hundred and four contracts safeguarded privacy in substance abuse programs. 
Id., p. 28. 
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Ninety contracts contained clauses relating to confidentiality of 
employment records, many relating to access to information in connec-
tion with investigation and processing of employee grievances.11 s Eighty-
one dealt specifically with medical records.119 Some provisions required 
only employee access to records, however, while others limited the 
employer's ability to engage in medical testing.120 
Seventy-eight contracts limited employer surveillance, but only 17 of 
those contained provisions dealing with electronic monitoring.121 
Fourteen of the 17 dealt with telephone monitoring.122 The report sug-
gests that the limited focus on electronic monitoring might be a result of 
union emphasis on protective legislation rather than bargaining or the rel-
ative lack of surveillance at the time.123 Professor Finkin suggests anoth-
er explanation: monitoring is more likely to affect white-collar employ-
ees, managers and supervisors, who are less frequently unionized. 124 No 
more recent comprehensive data was located, 12s but monitoring has cer-
118 Id., pp. 18-20. Others required employers to reprimand employees in private. Id., p. 20. 
These provisions raise another privacy issue that arises in the unionized workplace. 
Employees (and employers) may be concerned about disclosure of private employee infor-
mation to the union. While the National Labor Relations Act requires the employer to pro-
vide to the union information relevant and necessary to bargaining and contract administra-
tion, some confidential information need not be disclosed without authorization from the 
employee. See, e.g., Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979)(limiting disclosures of 
employee test scores); Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 252 NLRB 368 (!980)(finding no 
violation where employer refused to supply names of employees partially disabled by pneu-
moconiosis without employee authorization). But see Dep 't of the Air Force v. Fed 'l Lab. 
Rel. Auth., 104 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(relying on NLRA authority to order employer to 
give union supervisor's disciplinary letter where union showed it needed the letter to deter-
mine whether to file a grievance and also finding that the release of the material to the union 
under these circumstances was consistent with the Privacy Act). See also supra note 69. 
119 Id., p. 21. 
120 Id., pp. 25-26. 
121 Id., p. 38. The largest group of these dealt with polygraph testing. Id. Fifteen agreements 
limited searches of lockers and/or personal belongings. Id. at 42. 
122 Id. 
123 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, at 502-503. 
124 Id. 
125 A BNA survey of 122 unionized employers in 2003 revealed that 66 per cent had a drug 
and alcohol policy in their collective bargaining agreement; 55 per cent had a sexual harass-
ment policy; 30 per cent had a smoking policy; 29 per cent had an intemet/e-mail policy; 
and 12 per cent had an AIDS/HN policy. See J. Joseph et al., Employer Bargaining 
Objectives 2004, BNA, 2004, p. 55 available at <http://ecommercecenter.bna.com/ 
press/protected/2004ebo.pdf > (last visited July 7, 2005). The survey does not indicate, 
however, whether these policies contained any privacy provisions. Fifteen percent of 
employers planned to try to strengthen their drug and alcohol policies in upcoming negoti-
ations while 17 per cent wanted to increase smoking restrictions and 6 per cent desired to 
strengthen their internet policy. Id., p. 59. 
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tainly increased substantially since 1992.126 Moreover, some of the more 
recent monitoring techniques, such as GPS location monitoring, are more 
likely to affect blue-collar or unionized employees, such as truckdrivers 
and other delivery people.121 The increasing number of NLRB cases 
dealing with computer issues suggests also that these issues are becom-
ing more relevant to workers who are, or are seeking to become, union-
ized.128 Finally, many public-sector employees covered by union con-
tracts utilize computers in their work. 
An unscientific review of some union web sites found limited dis-
cussion of privacy issues other than drug testing. A 1997 memo on the 
website of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) discussed e-mail at work and recommended 
negotiation of an e-mail policy "to make sure that the workplace doesn't 
tum into an "electronic sweatshop."'129 The article identified several col-
lective bargaining agreements and memoranda of understanding address-
ing e-mail. Several addressed solely union use of e-mail, authorizing it 
with reasonable limitations.130 One provision, in a Newspaper Guild and 
Pioneer Press contract, stated: "'To ensure Productivity and good morale, 
the Pioneer Press affirms that users of electronic mail and voice mail sys-
tems shall have a zone of privacy ... "'131 The AFSCME article described 
the provision as allowing the employer to view e-mail or voicemail of 
employees based on reasonable cause, such as a lawsuit, suspicion of a 
crime, or the need to perform work in the employee's absence, if there 
were no other way to obtain the information.132 Further, certain procedur-
126 See supra notes 13-43 and accompanying text. 
127 See Technology Issues Outpace Guidance from NLRB. Attorneys Tell ABA Conference, 
supra note 3 (union attorney indicates that GPS monitoring is a troubling issue for 
unions). 
128 See id.; M. H. Malin and H. H. Perritt, Jr., 'The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces', U. Kan. L. Rev., Vol. 49, 
2000 p. 1; S. S. Robfogel, 'Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access 
and Employer Rights'. Lab. Law., Vol. 16, 2000, p. 231; G. A. Wilcox, 'Section 7 Rights 
of Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing', Lab. Law., Vol. 16, 
2000, p. 253; Guard Publishing Co., 2002 NLRB Lexis 70 (2002)(finding that employ-
er violated NLRA by discriminatory rule prohibiting use of e-mail for union purposes 
and by insisting on contract proposal that would codify discriminatory rule); Computer 
Associates, lnt'l, Advice Memorandum, l-CA-38933 (2001) (authorizing issuance of a 
complaint against employer's maintenance of rule prohibiting all non-business use of e-
mail, internet and intra-net). 
129 AFSCME, E-mail at Work, available at <http://www.afscme.org/wrkplace/cbr397_2.htm> 
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al steps, including notification of the employee were required before 
review.133 In addition, the provision noted that any enforcement of the 
policy that resulted in discipline would be subject to the contractual just 
cause standard.134 
The National Education Association Office of Higher Education also 
has addressed the issue of e-mail privacy, recommending negotiation of 
a policy to protect employees.135 At the time of the article, however, no 
NEA higher education contracts dealing with e-mail privacy were found, 
although several addressed use of e-mail by the union.136 The 
Communications Workers of America's web site indicates that the union 
has negotiated limitations on electronic monitoring.137 The Newspaper 
Guild's Model Contract suggests a provision regarding electronic moni-
toring which states: 
There shall be no secret surveillance of employees nor shall 
electronic supervisors, tape recordings, telephone monitoring 
systems, monitoring of employees' electronic files or voice mail, 
or similar procedures or devices be used. 138 
No indication of the number of contracts containing such provisions 
exists. The Model Contract also recommends a clause on outside activi-
ties, which states: 'Outside Activity. Employees shall be free to engage in 
any activities outside of working hours.'139 Again, however, there is no 
indication of the number of contracts containing such provisions. The 
National Association of Government Employees' agreement with the 
Federal Aviation Administration explicitly bars discipline for off-duty 
conduct unless it 'hampers his/her effectiveness as an employee or affects 
the public's confidence in the Agency.'140 The contract also pro-
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 'E-mail and Privacy', NEA Update, Vol. 2, No. 6, October 1996, available at 
http://www.2.nea.org/he/heupdate/v2n06.pdf (last visited September 29, 2005). 
136 Id. 
13 7 Communications Workers of America, Verizon East Bargaining Briefing Paper, 
<http://www.cwa-union.org/verity_search_results.cfm> (visited April 29, 2005). 
138 The Newspaper Guild, U.S. Model Contract, Article XXN- General Provisions, available 
at <http://www.newsguild.org/barg/display.php?storyID= 148> (visited April 29, 2005). 
139 Id. 
140 National Agreement Between the Nat'I Ass'n of Gov't Employees, SEIU/AFL-CIO and 
the Fed'! Aviation Administration, Dep't of Transportation, Article 5, Section 6, February 
25, 2004, available at <http://www.faa.gov/ahr/policy/agree/agrees/term/nage/nage l .cfm> 
(last visited September 29, 2005). This provision is similar to the test applied by arbitra-
tors under a just cause requirement. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
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tects the confidentiality of medical information of employees with AIDS 
or HIV.141 
Additional anecdotal evidence indicates that some unions and 
employers are negotiating provisions relating to electronic monitoring. 
An article regarding GPS-equipped cell phones used by employers to 
track employees indicates that 500 employees of the city of Chicago 
carry such phones to 'increase their productivity.' 142 The article indicates 
that the unions representing the employees obtained several limitations 
on the use of these devices, including permitting the employees to shut 
down the tracking features during lunch breaks and after work hours.143 
The Teamsters and UPS, and the City of Orlando and its police union, 
reportedly have negotiated about employer use of GPS technology.144 
Some federal sector unions reportedly have negotiated policies relating to 
personal use of phones and computers, along with agreements on video 
surveillance.145 The California State Employees Association has negoti-
ated with the state about electronic entry and exit monitoring systems in 
correctional facilities, one using fingerprints.146 
Drug testing has been a focus for unions for a longer period of time 
than electronic monitoring. There are numerous NLRB casesl47 and arbi-
tration decisionsl48 relating to drug testing. In particular, unions in the 
construction industry have addressed drug testing, perhaps because many 
141 Id. at Article 41, Section 3. The contract also extensively addresses substance abuse, 
including privacy issues. Id. at Articles 36, 37 and 38. 
142 B. Chamy, Big Boss is Watching, CNET News.com, available at <http:// 
news.com.com/Big+boss+is_ watching/2100-1036_3-53 79953 .html?part=rss&tag=5> 
(last visited May 2, 2005). 
143 Id. 
144 See 'Employee Tracking Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee 
Backlash', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004. Another report indicates that 
after negotiations the City of Orlando rejected the use of tracking devices, while the 
Teamsters and UPS agreed to prohibit monitoring on employees' personal time. See 
'Employer Use of GPS Units in Work Vehicles, Cell Phones, Stirs Employee Privacy 
Concerns', Gov 't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Vol. 42, 2071 (August 17, 2004). The 
Teamsters have also barred use of GPS technology to study efficiency or set time stan-
dards. Id. 
145 See 'As Employee Monitoring Expands, Attention Turns to Information, Policies', Lab. 
Rel. Wk. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 11 (March 17, 2005) (reporting on comments by union 
attorney David Kelly). 
146 See California State Employees Ass 'n v. California Youth Authority, 23 PERC (LRP) 
P30114 (1999). 
147 Developing Labor Law, op. cit., supra note 63, at pp. 1214-1215 and nn. 311-318. 
148 See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, (6th ed.), Alan Miles Ruben, 
Ed. in Chief, 2003, pp. 947-48, 1005-1012; C. L. Redel and A. Abbey, 'The Arbitration 
of Drug Use and Testing in the Workplace', Arb. J., Vol. 48, No. 1, March 1993, p. 80. 
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employees work on government contracted projects covered by the Drug 
Free Workplace Act. In addition, as noted by Sheet Metal Workers Local 
36, 
The facts about drug and alcohol use are sobering to those of us 
in the construction industry. Someone under the influence faces 
twice the risk of on-the-job injury as a clear headed worker; con-
struction workers are more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol 
than any other employee group; and the industry has a higher on-
the-job injury rate.149 
Many construction union apprenticeship programs prominently require 
drug testing for applicants.150 Some unions have negotiated or adopted 
detailed drug testing prograrns.151 The IBEW instituted drug testing for 
all of its officers and management personnel in 2005 after negotiating an 
agreement with the National Electrical Contractors' Association requir-
ing local unions to 'institute minimum standards providing for drug-free 
pools of construction workers nationwide, through voluntary screening 
149 See Labor Management Partnership, Sheet Metal Air Conditioning Contractors 
Association and Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, available at 
<http://www.sheetmeta136.org/LABOR%20AND%20MANAGEMENT%20PART-
NERSHIP.htm > (Last visited May 2, 2005). In 1999, the union approved a new drug 
testing program requiring initial testing of all members and continued random and cause 
testing. Id. Apprenticeship applicants are also tested. Id. 
150 See, e.g., West Virginia Construction Craft Laborers' Apprenticeship Program, available 
at <http://www.wvccl.org/apprenticeship.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005); Bridge, 
Structural and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local No. 1, available at <http://www.iwlo-
cal1.com/local_l_information.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005). See also Apprenticeship 
Programs with the Union Building Trades, available at <http://www.thehighschoolgrad-
uate.com/editorial/AC/ACtrades.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005) (informing readers of 
apprenticeship opportunities with 15 different building trades unions which require 
applicants to be drug free because '[n]umber one, it's the law. Secondly, worksites can 
be dangerous enough without impairment due to drug abuse. Lastly, property owners 
and contractors along with the Union Building Trades maintain a zero tolerance for drug 
abuse among the workforce.') 
151 See, e.g., Management and Unions Serving Together Drug Testing Policy, available at 
<http://www.must.org/formsanddocs/mustdrugtesting_081204.pdf> (last visited May 
2, 2005) (detailing drug testing policy of an organization composed of unions and con-
struction contractors in southeastern Michigan and specifying confidentiality provi-
sions); MMC Chosen to Administer Substance Abuse Program, Promote Safety at Ohio 
Construction Sites, (January 2003) available at http://www.estetacommunications.com/ 
NewsReleases/Cleveland.htm >(last visited May 2, 2005) (describing substance abuse 
program implemented by the Union Construction Industry Partnership (UCIP), a joint 
labor-management cooperative, to advance construction safety and implement a drug-
free workplace). 
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of j oumeymen and apprentices.' I 52 The union indicated an intent to nego-
tiate about drug testing with its own unionized employees in the upcom-
ing contract negotiations.153 Project Labor Agreements negotiated for 
large construction projects may contain drug testing requirements also.154 
4.2. Privacy in Arbitration 
Virtually all collective bargaining agreements contain a grievance and 
arbitration procedure to resolve disputes arising under the agreement. 
Arbitrators have confronted privacy issues even where there is no con-
tract provision directly addressing the subject. Most commonly, the 
issues arise where employees are disciplined or discharged and their chal-
lenge to the employer's action alleges a violation of privacy rights. In 
some cases, unions argue that arbitrators should suppress evidence 
obtained through searches that would violate the Fourth Amendment, 
even in the private sector where it does not directly apply.155 In addition, 
some arbitrations involve unilaterally-issued employer rules that impact 
employee privacy, challenged by unions as unreasonable under the col-
lective bargaining agreement.156 Like the courts, arbitrators tend to apply 
a balancing test in cases involving privacy, considering the business need 
for the employer's action and the protections for employee privacy 
rights.157 Another salient factor in these cases is whether the employer 
significantly changed working conditions.158 In public-sector arbitrations 
implicating privacy, arbitrators use the balancing test utilized in constitu-
tional cases.159 
152 '!BEW Implements Drug Testing For Officers, Reps, Management Staff' /BEW 
Journal, January/February 2005 available at <http://www.ibew.org/stories/05jour-
nal/050I/p19 .htm >(last visited May 2, 2005). 
153 Id. 
154 See San Diego County Water Authority Project Labor Agreement, available at 
<http://www.sdcwa.org/infra/esp-PLA.phtml >(last visited May 2, 2005) (requiring sub-
stance abuse testing). 
155 See, e.g., Aldens, Inc., Lab.Arb. (BNA), Vol. 58, McGury, 1972, p. 1213 (excluding evi-
dence); Commodity Warehousing Corp., Lab. Arb. (BNA), Vol. 60, Doppelt, 1973, p. 
1260 (admitting evidence). 
156 The agreement may expressly authorize issuance of reasonable rules but even where it 
does not, arbitrators will usually require that rules be reasonable. 
157 Elkouri and Elkouri, supra note 148, p. 1153. 
158 Id. 
159 See id., p. 1155. 
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A brief review of arbitral treatment of some particular privacy-relat-
ed issues will illustrate the role of privacy in arbitration. One group of 
cases involves employer efforts to obtain information that employees 
deem private. In these cases, most arbitrators will require employees to 
turn over information where the employer shows a legitimate need and 
the request is neither vague nor overbroad.160 In the public sector, arbi-
trators may look for a compelling need and a narrowly tailored request 
for information.161 Arbitrators do not always reach the same conclusions 
in these cases, however, even on similar facts.162 
Like cases involving employee information, cases challenging 
employer surveillance go both ways depending on the facts. Where the 
employer shows a particular need, the surveillance is likely to be upheld 
so long as it is not overly intrusive.163 Typically, however, the cases do not 
involve specific contractual provisions relating to either privacy or sur-
veillance, but rather challenges to the reasonableness of employer prac-
tices or to discipline resulting from surveillance. Employer searches of 
employee belongings and/or lockers have been the subject of a number of 
arbitrations. The touchstones of such decisions are notice to employees 
and reasonableness of the search.164 In these cases, arbitrators may find 
an increased expectation of privacy if the employer requires or allows 
employees to use their own locks.165 
Arbitrators frequently deal with issues relating to drug and alcohol 
testing.166 Where tests are not properly conducted, discipline is common-
ly set aside.167 When an employer unilaterally adopts random drug test-
ing, arbitrators will typically apply a reasonableness analysis to deter-
mine whether random testing is justified and whether to uphold 
discipline based on such tests.168 If the job is safety-sensitive and there is 
evidence of a serious drug problem, random testing is more likely to be 
160 Seeid.,pp.1153-1155. 
161 See id., p. 1155. 
162 See id., pp. 1156-1157 (discussing cases reaching different results on whether employ-
ers can require employees to wear name tags where union challenged the requirement 
on privacy grounds). 
163 See id., pp. 1157-1159. 
164 See id., pp. 1161-1164. 
165 Id., p. 1162. One arbitrator even upheld a search of an employee's residence authorized 
by his ex-wife who had control over it at the time. Id., p. 1164. 
166 For a thorough review of issues relating to drugs and alcohol in the workplace, see F. 
Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, Resolving Drug Issues, 1993. 
167 Elkouri and Elkouri, supra note 148, p. I 006. 
168 Id., pp. 1007-1008. Results of the cases differ, however, even on similar facts. See F. 
Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 166, pp. 233-235. 
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upheld.169 Arbitrators have also required employees to provide informa-
tion to their employers about prescription drugs they are taking based on 
the employer's interest in ensuring workplace safety and ensuring that 
drug test results are accurate.170 
Off-duty conduct is also frequently the subject of arbitration, usual-
ly under provisions requiring just cause for discipline. The standard treat-
ment is to limit discipline to situations where the employer can demon-
strate that the conduct impacts the employer's business.171 Such a rule 
limits the control that the employer retains over the employee's private 
life. In some jobs, notably in the education sector, arbitrators have 
engaged in heightened scrutiny of the employees' private lives because of 
the nature of the job, finding termination warranted more frequently.172 
This review of arbitral authority indicates that even where unions 
have not negotiated privacy provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments, they will utilize privacy arguments in challenging discipline under 
just cause provisions or in challenging employer-implemented rules. 
Privacy arguments are accepted by arbitrators where employers cannot 
show a substantial need to invade employee privacy. Thus, while it 
appears that specific privacy provisions have not been extensively incor-
porated in collective bargaining agreements, unions have utilized privacy 
arguments to challenge employer rules and employee discipline that 
impacts on privacy rights. 
5. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 
The International Labour Office (ILO) recommends the involvement of 
workers' representatives in matters relating to employee privacy, includ-
ing collection of personal data and electronic monitoring.173 The Council 
of Europe makes a similar recommendation for its members, but there is 
169 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 148, pp. 1008-1010. 
170 See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 166, pp. 75-79. 
171 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, supra note 148, pp. 938-939. See, e.g., 'Champion lnt'I', 
Lab. Arb. (BNA), Vol. 96, Statham, 1991, p. 325, (reinstating employee who pied guilty 
to off-duty drug dealing because there was no nexus to employment despite substance 
abuse policy and rule authorizing discipline for criminal conviction that reflects unfa-
vorably on company or employee involved). 
172 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 148, pp. 1311-1314. The test does not 
differ but because education employees are viewed as role models for students, their off-
duty conduct is more frequently deemed to have affected the job. 
173 J. T. Aranda, 'Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The Role of Worker 
Representatives', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J., Vol. 23, 2002, pp. 533-535. 
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no binding treaty provision so requiring.174 In several European Union 
member states, however, the law requires involvement of worker repre-
sentatives where employers undertake certain actions that impact 
employee privacy. Germany, Italy, Spain, and France all require either 
notice or consultation or both when the employer installs or changes sys-
tems for worker surveillance,175 as do Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. t 76 France, Germany and Italy have particularly stringent 
requirements for consultation. If the works council in France is not con-
sulted about monitoring, it is a criminal offense. 177 If notice to the 
employee and consultation of the works council have not occurred, any 
information gathered is invalid and cannot be used as proof of any 
wrongdoing by the employee.178 German law prohibits collection of data 
regarding employee phone calls and e-mails unless the employee or the 
174 Id. The European Commission is planning to issue a directive on protection of workers' 
personal data in 2005, after having consulted with the social partners, employer and 
union federations, on the issue in 2001 and 2002. See Commission Issues Five-Year 
Social Agenda (February 2005), available at <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2005/02/fea-
ture/eu0502205f.html > (last visited September 30, 2005); A. Broughton, Commission 
Issues Second Stage Consultation on Data Protection, available at <http:// 
www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/1 l/feature/eu0211206f.html>, (last visited September 30, 
2005). This directive would supplement existing general directives on the processing of 
personal data which apply to the workplace but do not specifically address workplace 
issues. See C. Delbar, M. Mormont and M. Schots, New Technology and Respect for 
Privacy at the Workplace, (2003, available at <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/ 
2003/07/study/tn0307l01 s.html>, (last visited September 30, 2005). The suggested 
framework proposed by the EC at the second stage consultation included a provision that 
worker representatives be consulted before installation, modification or evaluation of any 
system of employee surveillance. See id. 
175 See J. T. Aranda, supra note 173, pp. 536-537; A. L. Goldman, 'Overview and U.S. 
Perspective', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, p. 1. Finnish law also requires 
employers to inform employees of electronic monitoring and discuss the monitoring 
with those employees, while substantially restricting such monitoring by law. A. 
Suviranta, 'The Impact of Electronics on Labor Law in Finland', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y 
J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 93-107. 
176 C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174. In the Netherlands, the Works Council has a 
veto power on any changes in personal data collection or employee monitoring. Id. 
Luxembourg requires co-determination by a joint committee regarding any technical 
equipment used to monitor employees. Id. In Sweden, negotiation is required on any 
changes in matters involving personal integrity, such as medical tests, and those involv-
ing information and communication technology. Id. 
177 J.-E. Ray and J. Rojot, 'A Comparative Study of the Impact of Electronic Technology on 
Workplace Disputes', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol 'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 117-134. 
178 Id. The collective agreement cannot waive the statutory protections. Id., pp. 133-134. 
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union consents.179 No collective bargaining agreement can supersede the 
law unless it 'observes statutory provisions and especially the obligation 
of both social partners to protect and promote the free development of the 
personality of the employees.'180 In Germany, the employer also must pay 
for expert advice for the union if it is necessary to understand any new 
system.181 The German law provides the union and the employer with 
significant authority over the privacy protection available to employ-
ees.182 In Italy, an agreement with the local union must precede installa-
tion of video surveillance for security or productivity purposes.183 If a 
union is set up after the installation, the union must agree to retaining the 
system.184 Failure to comply subjects the employer to a criminal sanc-
tion.185 
In the United Kingdom, the legislation does not require consultation 
but the Employment Practices Data Protection Code issued by the 
Information Commissioner recommends consultation with trade unions 
over any practice that involves employees' personal data.186 While 
Belgium has no specific legal requirement of consultation with worker 
representatives on privacy issues created by new technologies, existing 
general law and practice would require information and consultation.187 
These laws and regulations provide opportunities for worker representa-
tives to influence the employer's adoption and application of technology 
that impacts worker privacy.188 
179 A. Roeland, 'A Comparative Study of the Impact of Electronic Technology on 
Workplace Dispute: National Report on Germany', Comp. Lab. L. & Poly J., Vol. 24, 
2002, pp. 147, 165-166. 
180 Id., p. 166. 
181 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 536. 
182 Id. 
183 P. Balboni, 'Video Surveillance and Related Privacy and Data Protection Issues: The 
Italian Experience', to be published in Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven 
Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy, S. Nouwt, B. R. de 
Vries and C. Prins (eds.), 2005, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=721422#PaperDownload >, p. 20. 
184 Id., p. 22. 
185 Id. 
186 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 537. 
187 R. Blanpain, 'Some Belgian and European Aspects', Comp. Lab. L. & PolyJ., Vol. 24, 
2002, pp. 47, 63, 64. 
188 See M. Rustad and S. R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail And Internet Usage: 
Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshops: Insights from Europe, available at 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/suffolk/ip/papers/6>, 2005, p. 48 (noting that the right to privacy 
for European workers is 'inextricably linked with the development of trade unions, 
worker self-control and self-determination). 
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Legislation in Europe also provides for union representation of 
employees challenging invasions of privacy. A European Community 
Directive 'requires that: "Each [national] supervisory authority shall hear 
claims lodged by any person, or by an association representing that per-
son, concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the 
processing of personal data. . .. " (emphasis added)' 189 The laws of 
Germany and Italy make similar provisions for workers to be aided by 
works council members and associations, respectively.190 Unions in 
Belgium also have such representation rights.191 
Finally, some collective bargaining agreements in other countries 
deal with privacy issues.192 Australian unions in some industries have 
negotiated limitations on employer surveillance of employee computer 
use.193 In New Zealand, the introduction of new technology is negotiable 
and some collective agreements have incorporated provisions relating to 
the subject.194 A 2003 report on technology and privacy in the European 
Union reports that multi-employer bargaining on the issue is not com-
mon, citing agreements in Belgium, Norway and Denmark as the excep-
tions.195 Collective agreements at the workplace level are not unusual, 
however.196 The study notes that such bargaining is occurring not only in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden, all of which have legislation or central agreements requiring at 
least some consultation, but also in Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom.197 
In Belgium, the national collective agreement, which applies to all 
private employers, governs employee privacy and online communications 
189 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 539. The Council of Europe and the ILO make 
similar recommendations. Id., pp. 539-540. 
190 Id., p. 540. 
191 R. Blanpain, op. cit., supra note 187, p. 64. 
192 See J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, at 538-539 (describing the Belgian National 
Agreement on video surveillance and the recommendation of the French National 
Commission for Computer Technologies and Personal Freedom that privacy concerns 
relating to computers be negotiated between employers and unions). 
193 R. McCallum and A. Steward, 'The Impact of Electronic Technology on Workplace 
Disputes in Australia', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'yl., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 19, 39-40. 
194 J. M. Howells, 'Electronic Technology and Workplace Issues: The New Zealand 
Situation', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol 'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 225, 240-241. The contract pro-
visions discussed in the article do not focus on privacy issues, however, and the law in 
New Zealand does not limit employer monitoring in any significant way, except for a 
notice requirement. See id., pp. 234-35, 240. 
195 C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. The exact number of such agreements is unknown, but the report cites examples of 
specific agreements in France and Spain. Id. 
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data.198 Detailed information regarding monitoring or control must be 
provided to the workers' representatives or in the absence of a represen-
tative, to the workers themselves. 199 The only legitimate reasons for such 
action are the following: 1. 'Prevention of unacceptable or slanderous 
acts . . . ; ' 2. Protecting the employer's confidentiality interests; 3. 
Protection of the information technology network; or 4. '[B]onafide con-
trol of the policy rules' of the employer concerning use of technology.200 
Additionally, the employer's control must not interfere with the employ-
ees' private lives any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate pur-
poses of the employer.201 The agreement also strictly limits the employ-
er's use of data to identify individuals sending or receiving electronic 
communications. 202 
In Norway, the central 'basic agreement' contains a supplementary 
agreement on monitoring which requires notice and discussion with the 
union, bars discrimination in monitoring, and mandates consultation with 
the union regarding the handling of information received through moni-
toring.203 The Danish trade union confederation and the confederation of 
employers also negotiated a supplement requiring notice of new monitor-
ing controls.204 In addition, the social partners in the European Union 
have negotiated a framework for telecommuting workers which contains 
provisions regarding worker privacy and limitations on employer moni-
toring of workers.205 This agreement will be implemented by the trade 
unions and employers, rather than by EU Directive.206 
Though some variations exist, many of the countries discussed have 
much broader legal protection for privacy than the u.s.201 and, in addi-
tion, provide for an important consultative role for worker representatives 
on matters relating to employee privacy. The legislative and collectively 
198 R. Blanpain, op. cit., supra note 187, p. 60. 
199 Id., p. 62. 
200 Id., p. 61. 
201 Id. 
202 Id., p. 63. 
203 C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174. 
204 Id. There is also a general provision in the national agreement in Greece recognizing 
employee rights to privacy. Id. 
205 A. Broughton, Social Partners Sign Teleworking Accord, available at 
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/07 /feature/eu0207204 f.html>, (last visited 
September 30, 2005). 
206 Id. 
207 See M. Rustad and S. R. Paulsson, op. cit., supra note 188, pp. 51-89 (discussing 
European legislation and noting the importance of privacy as a fundamental human right 
in Europe which is protected without distinction between public and private work-
places); Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174, (discussing privacy legislation at the 
European Community and national level). 
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bargained provisions enable labor organizations in these countries to play 
a proactive role in shaping the employer's privacy policy within the lim-
its of the law. 
6. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A VEHICLE FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION 
FOR U.S. EMPLOYEES 
Can collective bargaining play a greater role in privacy protection for 
employees in the United States? First, it is important to recognize the role 
that collective bargaining has played to date. While there does not appear 
to be widespread negotiation of privacy provisions in collective bargain-
ing agreements, contractual privacy protection has developed for union-
ized employees through arbitration. Such protection is comparable to the 
constitutional protection available in the public sector. Unions have con-
tested employee discipline and challenged employer rules and practices 
on privacy grounds. They have established some general rules regarding 
privacy that are typically applied by arbitrators interpreting general pro-
visions in collective bargaining agreements, to the benefit of represented 
employees. In interpreting agreements, arbitrators balance the employer's 
legitimate business needs with the employees' privacy interests. These 
arbitral principles then shape the future conduct of unionized employers 
dealing with privacy issues. In this time of shrinking, and thus weaker 
unions, arbitration under contractual just cause provisions and reasonable 
rule requirements may be the best vehicle available for protecting the pri-
vacy of employees represented by unions. 
The limitation of this approach is its lack of predictability. 
Arbitrators are not bound by precedent and, as seen above, arbitrators 
may reach different determinations on similar facts. Thus, without pre-
dictable rules, employees may be uncertain of their rights. This uncertain-
ty may lead employees to permit privacy infringements out of fear ofter-
mination, or to risk discharge without sufficient information as to the 
probability that a termination will be upheld in arbitration. Thus, at least 
in some cases, the protection may be more theoretical than real. 
To combat this problem, unions could increase their efforts to nego-
tiate explicit contractual privacy protections, supplementing the reactive 
approach to privacy with a more proactive one. Collective determination 
of privacy protections has some significant advantages. Collectively-bar-
gained privacy provisions, with or without enhanced legal regulation, can 
be targeted at the issues most relevant to the particular workplace and the 
privacy concerns of the employees in the bargaining unit. Negotiation of 
privacy protections can provide employers with the flexibility necessary 
to operate in their particular markets, while ensuring the protection of 
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employee privacy interests.2os As noted above, there are a wide range of 
privacy issues affecting workers - from computer monitoring to genetic 
testing to off-duty smoking bans. Some may be of little importance to 
workers in a particular workplace while others may be of vital interest. 
The union can identify and address those issues of importance and trade 
off in bargaining those that are not. In addition, unions and employers can 
respond to changes in technology more quickly than legislatures, dealing 
collectively with new issues raised by rapidly evolving technologies.209 
Furthermore, litigation pursuant to legislation is a time-consuming and 
expensive method of protecting employee rights. Collective action, 
through bargaining, provides an alternative method of protecting privacy 
that requires fewer resources from the employee, employer and govern-
ment. Thus the goal of privacy protection may be achieved more effi-
ciently. 
Is collective bargaining a substitute for enhanced privacy legislation 
or a supplement to such legislation?2IO Initially, it should be noted that 
208 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, pp. 538-539. 
209 Id. For example, after a security breach involving identifiable information of employees 
at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Treasury Employees Union, 
which represents almost 5000 FDIC employees, demanded additional assistance from 
the agency for employees to prevent and respond to identity theft. See 'FDIC Informs 
Employees of Data Breach; Union Seeks Better ID Theft Assistance', Gov 't Employee 
Rel. Rep. (BNA), Vol. 43, at p. 43 (June 28, 2005). 
210 Unions should be aware that by negotiating privacy protections, they may in some cases 
waive employee rights to judicial action. In the private sector, the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on whether the union can waive employee rights, but has held that for such a 
waiver to be effective, it must be clear and unequivocal. Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70(1998). Only the Fourth Circuit has found such a waiver. See, 
e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that collec-
tive bargaining agreement's provisions 'clearly and unmistakably' waived the employ-
ee's right to litigate her sex discrimination claim in court). The majority of courts have 
declined to find union waivers of employee rights to litigation. See, e.g., Rogers v. New 
York University, 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000); Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. Northwest Air Lines, 
Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Bratten v. SS! Servs. Inc., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 
1999). Public employers, like private employers, have attempted to limit judicial litiga-
tion of statutory claims based on collective bargaining agreements, with limited success. 
See R. J. Kramer, 'Wright or Wrong: Can Employers and Unions Waive an Employee's 
Right to a Judicial Forum for Statutory Claims', Urban Lwyr., Vol. 36, 2004, pp. 825, 
832-836. In the federal sector, however, under the Civil Service Reform Act, judicial 
action may be precluded where a collective bargaining agreement covers the dispute 
unless the action falls within one of the statutory exceptions or unless the collective bar-
gaining agreement excludes the matter from the grievance procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 
7121; Whitman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 382 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004). While Whitman found 
that the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's constitutional privacy claim because 
it was covered by his collective bargaining agreement, the circuits are split on the issue 
and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Whitman to resolve the issue. 2005 U.S. 
Lexis 5032 (June 27, 2005). 
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employers are not required to bargain with unions regarding hiring prac-
tices so that collective bargaining is unlikely to protect the privacy rights 
of applicants for employment. Nor will it protect managers and supervi-
sors. Thus, many individuals will not be protected by negotiated privacy 
protections. Yet passage of comprehensive privacy legislation seems 
unlikely. Additionally, even narrower legislation relating to workplace 
privacy has failed to pass at the federal level and in most states. While 
repeated revelations of privacy invasions outrage the public for a time, 
most recently the Choicepoint scandal, the push for protection, particu-
larly at the workplace level, is generally insufficient to move legislation 
forward. In addition, there is an anti-regulatory political climate present 
in the U.S. today that does not bode well for privacy legislation. Critics 
of regulation argue, inter alia, that extensive regulation in this era where 
businesses need flexibility to respond to rapidly changing market condi-
tions hampers the competitiveness of American business. Increased reg-
ulation is one factor influencing the relocation of operations overseas. If 
more expansive legal regulation is unlikely, then unions, where they exist, 
can provide greater protection for employees than the law currently pro-
vides while offering employers the flexibility that may be necessary to 
compete in global markets. 
Moreover, even in the face of privacy legislation, there is a role for 
collective bargaining, as legal regulation necessarily paints with a broad 
brush.211 Like the worker representatives in European countries with 
stronger privacy legislation, U.S. unions can assist in shaping the specif-
ic workplace rules to implement legislative directives. The evidence sug-
gests that more unions are focusing on issues of computer privacy. As 
computers become ever more prevalent in the workplace,212 privacy con-
cerns will increase. Proactive participation by labor organizations on the 
front end can provide employees a greater voice in setting the terms of 
their employment and limiting employer inroads on employees' private 
lives. The new frontiers of privacy - computer monitoring, particularly 
location monitoring, and off-duty employee blogging - provide avenues 
for unions to test their ability to obtain collectively bargained privacy 
protections. Instead of merely arbitrating the grievance of the employee 
discharged for creating a blog that offends the employer, the union can 
negotiate the rules on off-duty blogging. Negotiated rules will provide a 
better balance of employer needs and employee rights than those created 
211 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 538. 
212 As of2001, almost 57 per cent of the workforce aged 25 and over used a computer at work 
and almost 42 per cent used the internet and/or e-mail. GAO Report, supra note 33, p. 4. 
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unilaterally, since even enlightened employers may be unaware or uncon-
vinced of employee needs and interests. 
To the extent that legislation exists, unions can provide assistance to 
employees in enforcing their legal rights.213 In general, enforcement of 
legal rights is more effective in the unionized workplace because the 
union has resources to assist employees and protects employees from 
retaliation for asserting their rights. Furthermore, in some areas involv-
ing privacy, particularly those relating to technology, professional experts 
may be necessary and affordable only with union representation. 
One significant limitation to this approach, however, is the shrinking 
percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements in the 
U.S. Unionization in the private sector is particularly limited. Unions rep-
resent such a small percentage of the workforce that even universal nego-
tiation of privacy protections would benefit a fraction of the workforce. 
And as unionization has decreased, collective power has decreased also, 
making it more difficult for unions to achieve their goals in collective 
bargaining. Thus, a desire for more contractual privacy protection may 
not be reflected in reality.214 In addition, there is a risk that a weak union 
might be forced to sacrifice employee privacy protections available by 
statute if the law permits union waiver.215 In the public sector, where 
unionization is more prevalent, collectively-bargained privacy protec-
tions could have a greater impact. Moreover, more unionized employees 
in the public sector are likely to be affected by employer techniques like 
computer monitoring. Although public employees have constitutional 
privacy protections, contractual privacy rights may be quicker and cheap-
er to enforce through the grievance and arbitration procedure. In the pub-
lic sector, however, the right to bargain may be more limited as a result 
of statutory provisions. 
There is another possible approach to regulation of workplace priva-
cy. In the current political climate there is a trend toward self-regulation, 
in the workplace and elsewhere.216 If this trend continues, we may see 
privacy issues in the workplace addressed through legislative or judicial 
provisions that promote self-regulation. As explained by Professor 
213 Unions could play a similar role in an expanded regime of common law privacy rights. 
See W.R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, pp. 154-159. 
214 For example, the UAW mounted a legal challenge on constitutional grounds to a provi-
sion in bargaining agreement it negotiated, suggesting that it had insufficient power to 
eliminate the clause in negotiations. See supra note 73. 
215 Given the very limited protections currently available to private sector employees, how-
ever, this is not a significant risk at present. 
216 For extensive discussion of this trend, see C. Estlund, 'Rebuilding the Law of the 
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation', Co/um. L. Rev., Vol. 105, 2005, p. 319. 
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Estlund, self-regulation can be effective if there are organizations that 
serve as monitors.217 A labor organization could participate as an inter-
nal monitor where it has representation rights, but Estlund suggests that 
unions can also serve as monitors of self-regulation where they do not 
represent a majority of the workers.218 Unions might join with organiza-
tions dedicated to protecting privacy rights of all citizens to monitor busi-
nesses to insure respect for privacy of customers as well as employees. In 
addition joint employer-employee committees might serve a monitoring 
role in some industries to insure compliance with privacy protections.219 
Unions could assist employee committee representatives even without 
majority representation rights. While resource limitations may affect the 
ability of unions to perform such functions, employees who see the ben-
efit of unions in this context might later become union members or 
organize their workplaces. 
Does this theoretical expansion of the union role in enforcement of 
employee privacy interests show practical promise? Despite the benefits 
described, a significantly greater role for collective bargaining in privacy 
protection seems somewhat unlikely in the present climate. Private-sec-
tor unions are losing members and power. The public sector, where 
unionization rates are stable, offers greater promise than the private sec-
tor where existing legislation does not limit bargaining rights. The intru-
siveness of new technologies in monitoring employees, and the growing 
concern about citizen and consumer privacy, may spur unions to put more 
emphasis on negotiating privacy protections. In an ideal world, collec-
tively-bargained privacy protections could balance employer needs and 
employee interests, providing flexibility to tailor the provisions to fit cur-
rent conditions and alter them with changing technology. Realistically, 
however, collective bargaining will probably continue to play a restricted 
role in the privacy arena. Existing protection through arbitration may 
remain the primary vehicle for protecting the privacy rights of employees 
in the unionized workplace. 
217 Id., pp. 355-383. 
218 Id., pp. 388-389. 
219 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, pp. 537-538. 
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